Constitution of the State of California, 1849
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty: acquiring, possessing and protecting property:
and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Sec. 21.
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created”.
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen
of the state.
Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, (1924)
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950)
"A statute does not trump the Constitution."
People v. Ortiz, (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 292, fn. 2
Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JERRY ARBERT POOL, C.A. No. 09-10303,
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
(Opinion filed September 14, 2010), On Appeal From The United
States District Court For The Eastern District of California
CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SHORT TITLE
by the provisions of this code,
There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of the exercise of a constitutional right.
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1973)
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)
GARRITY v. NEW JERSEY, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)
MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, ...
Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.App.2d 25
[Civ. No. 13391. Second Dist., Div. One. Feb. 17, 1942.]
Obviously, administrative agencies, like police officers must obey the Constitution and may not deprive persons
of constitutional rights.
Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 18 Cal.3d 308
[S.F. No. 23217. Supreme Court of California. November 23, 1976.]
has 'seized' that person."
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person including those consuming no more
than a minute. (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 879-880 [45 L.Ed.2d at
pp. 615-616].)
PEOPLE v. SPICER, (1984)157 Cal.App.3d 213
The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories of police contact with
persons. The first is referred to as a "consensual encounter" in which there is no restraint
on the person's liberty. There need be no objective justification for such an encounter.
The second type, called "detention," involves a seizure
of the individual for a limited duration
and for limited purposes. A
constitutionally acceptable detention can occur "if there is an
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit
a crime." The third
type involves seizures in the nature of an arrest,
which may occur only if the police have
probable cause to arrest the
person for a crime. (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. 491; Wilson
v.
Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 777.)
PEOPLE v. BAILEY, 176 Cal.App.3d 402
[No. H000583. Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District. December 17,1985.]
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY"
[1]
The federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable
seizures. Our state Constitution includes a similar
prohibition. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) "A seizure occurs whenever a
police officer 'by means
of physical force or show of authority'
restrains the liberty of a person to walk away." (People v. Souza
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229, quoting
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19,
fn. 16.) Whether a seizure has taken place is to be determined by
an objective test, which asks "not
whether the citizen perceived that
he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would
have conveyed that to a reasonable person."
(California v. Hodari D. (1999) 499 U.S. 621, 628.) Thus, when police
engage in conduct
that would "communicate[] to a reasonable person that
he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
business," there
has been a seizure. (Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S.
626, 629; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437.)
When the
seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an
arrest warrant or by probable cause. (Kaupp v. Texas, supra,
538 U.S.
at p. 630.) Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting
officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution"
that the person
to be arrested has committed a crime. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)
In
Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court
created a limited exception that allows police officers to "stop and .
. .
frisk for weapons" when they have an "articulable suspicion [the] person has committed or is about to commit a crime."
(Florida v.
Royer, supra, at p. 498.) [2] Thus, an officer who lacks
probable cause to arrest can conduct a brief investigative detention
when there is
" 'some objective manifestation' that criminal activity is afoot
and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity." (People
v.
Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230; see also United States v. Cortez
(1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417.) Because an investigative detention allows
the police to ascertain whether suspicious conduct is criminal
activity, such a detention "must be temporary and last no longer than
is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." (Florida v. Royer,
supra, at p. 500; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d
777, 784 [describing a detention as limited in "duration, scope and
purpose"].)
The distinction between a detention and an arrest
"may in some instances create difficult line-drawing problems." (United
States v. Sharpe
(1985) 470 U.S. 675, 685; see also United States v.
Torres-Sanchez (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1127 [there is no "
'bright-line for
determining when an investigatory stop crosses the
line and becomes an arrest' "].) [3] This much is clear: A brief stop
and pat-down of
someone suspected of criminal activity
is merely an investigative detention requiring no more than a
reasonable suspicion. (Terry v.
Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 6-7.)
People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667
[6] The basic premise behind "consensual encounters" is that a citizen
may consent voluntarily to official intrusions upon interests protected
by the Constitution. If the citizen acts in reasonable submission to a
show of authority, then his actions are not voluntary or consensual.
Where
consensual, consent may be withdrawn at any time. (People v.Gurtenstein
(1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 441 , 451 [138 Cal.Rptr. 161].)
The citizen participant
in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or decline
to act in the manner requested by the authorities.
...if the manner in which the request was made constituted a show of
authority such that appellant reasonably might believe he had to comply,
then the encounter was transformed into a detention.
People v. Franklin , 192 Cal.App.3d 935
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY"
...evidence also supports the conclusion Ms. Spicer's freedom of movement was restrained by a show of authority. (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 508];Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 501 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 239, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1326];In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888 , 895 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].) She was confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she was riding was stopped. Without any explanation or prefatory remarks, the officer requested her driver's license.
The nature of the questions asked by the officer during a contact are also relevant to the seizure issue. (SeeWilson, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791;Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554.) An unequivocal verbal command is far more likely to produce the perception of restricted liberty than a mere approach (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820 , 825-826 [158 Cal.Rptr. 415]), casual banter (People v. Warren, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 996), or an ambiguous statement which could be either a command or a request. (People v. King (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 346 , 349-350 [139 Cal.Rptr. 926].) Furthermore, "'a reasonable person might read an officer's "May I" as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.'" (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 289 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 898, 93 S.Ct. 2041], Marshall, J., dis.) The attitude expressed by Ms. Spicer toward the police is credible and almost certainly typical. She testified, "I just felt like if a policeman should ever stop me if he wants my purse he will ask me. If he asks me to get out of car I am coming out with [my] hands free. I have read too many people getting shot these days by policemen who thought ...." fn. 3
It
is especially pertinent to this case that the officer did not explain
to Ms. Spicer his reason for requesting her driver's license. In People
v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99 , 118 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135],
our Supreme Court stated, "While we reject an absolute requirement of a
warning of the right to refuse permission as a precondition to a
consent search, we do not intend to discourage the giving of such
advice in appropriate cases. In view of the settled rule
that the lack of such a warning is a factor to be taken into account in
applying the totality of the circumstances test [citations omitted],
the police would be well advised in close cases to 'make a record' by
expressly giving the admonition ...." In Mendenhall the
majority found that knowledge of the right to refuse a search request
was "highly relevant" to the determination that there had been
consent.(446 U.S. at pp. 558-559 [64 [157 Cal.App.3d 220] L.Ed.2d at
pp. 512-513].) Where, as here, the circumstances are
pregnant with coercion, an admonition along the lines mentioned in
James was called for.
PEOPLE v. SPICER , 157 Cal.App.3d 213
[Crim. No. 45072. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate
District, Division Seven. June 15, 1984.]
REID v. GEORGIA, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result.
Although I agree that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons," id., at 19, n. 16, and that policemen may approach citizens on the street and ask them questions without "seizing" them for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, once an officer has identified himself and asked a traveler for identification and his airline ticket, the traveler has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. By identifying themselves and asking for Royer's airline ticket and driver's license the officers, as a practical matter, engaged in a "show of authority" and "restrained [460 U.S. 491, 512] [Royer's] liberty." Ibid. It is simply wrong to suggest that a traveler feels free to walk away when he has been approached by individuals who have identified themselves as police officers and asked for, and received, his airline ticket and driver's license.
BERKEMER v. McCARTY, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)
"[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 19 , n. 16.
See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 -557 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); id., at 560, n. 1 (POWELL, J., concurring in part);
United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1166 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981);
United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 984-985 (CA5 1981);
United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 462-465 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981);
United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 432-433, and n. 6 (CA5 1980);
United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1220-1221 (CA5 1980);
United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038-1042 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980)
[9] It is axiomatic, of course, that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the California and federal Constitutions with only a few carefully circumscribed exceptions, and that the People have the burden of proving that any search without a warrant comes within one of those exceptions. (People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850, 855 [157 Cal.Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467], and cases cited.) see generally 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) § 5.3 (a).)
People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711
A 17-year-old boy enjoyed, and was entitled to assert, rights under the Cal. Const., art. I, § 13, protecting persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In re Scott K. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 395
...a detention occurs if the suspect is not free to leave at will -- if he is kept in the officer's presence by physical restraint, threat of force, or assertion of authority. (See, e.g., Restani v. Superior Court (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 189, 197 [91 Cal.Rptr. 429].) But the definition is underinclusive: actual or threatened physical restraints are the characteristics of a full-blown arrest (Pen. Code, § 835), and an officer will frequently use more subtle methods to detain a suspect whom he wishes simply to question about possible criminal activity. The definition is also overinclusive: either through fear or respect, many persons who are not in fact under detention nevertheless do not feel free to leave at will when a uniformed police officer indicates a desire to talk with them.
In re Tony C., 21 Cal.3d 888
[Crim. No. 20142. Supreme Court of California. August 24, 1978.]
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY" IN RELATION TO SO-CALLED "TRAFFIC STOPS"
The Legislature has identified the POLICE CONTACT where you're issued a NOTICE TO APPEAR as an "ARREST", not a "traffic stop". The POLICE CONTACT is a COMPULSORY RESTRAINT on your freedom. When done without a WARRANT it's PRESUMED ILLEGAL.
made without a warrant, and burden rests on prosecution to show proper justification.
People v. Holguin (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d. 520 [302 P.2d. 635]
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search,...
United States v. Robinson, (1973) 414 U.S. 218
DIVISION 17. OFFENSES AND PROSECUTION
CHAPTER 2. PROCEDURE ON ARRESTS
Article 1. Arrests .......................................... 40300 - 40313
warrant for offenses committed in their presence,
40500. (a) Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic offenses and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as provided in this chapter, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, containing the name and address of the person, the license number of his or her vehicle, if any, the name and address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the time and place when and where he shall appear. If the arrestee does not have a driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her possession, the officer may require the arrestee
40504. (a) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the arrested person and the arrested person in order to secure release must give his or her written promise to appear in court... Thereupon, the arresting officer shall forthwith release the person arrested from custody.
Vehicle Code section 40504, subdivision (a), commands that when a traffic offender such as defendant herein gives his written promise to appear by signing two copies of the citation, "Thereupon the arresting officer shall forthwith release the person arrested from custody." (Italics added.)
People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577
[Crim. No. 20293. Supreme Court of California. October 25, 1979.]
...the violator is, during the period immediately preceding his execution of the promise to appear, under arrest. (People v. Weitzer (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 274, 294 [75 Cal.Rptr. 318]; People v. Valdez (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 459, 462 [48 Cal.Rptr. 840].) fn. 2
The Vehicle Code however, refers to the person awaiting citation as "the arrested person." fn. 3
People v. Hubbard, (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 827
A detention is a seizure of the person which is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 993-994.) An arrest is also a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections. (See Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784 [195 Cal.Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325] [the three levels of police contacts subject to Fourth Amendment protections are consensual encounter, investigative detention, and arrest].)
People v. Velasquez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 555
When the plaintiff has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty by the defendant, "the law presumes it to be unlawful."
People v. McGrew, 20 Pac. 92 (1888);
Knight v. Baker, 133 P. 544 (1926)
One more thing before we begin: In addition to investigative detentions, there are two other types of temporary seizures. The first (and most common) is the traffic stop. Although traffic stops are technically “arrests” when (as is usually the case) the officer witnessed the violation and, therefore, had probable cause, traffic stops are subject to the same rules as investigative detentions.6
Fn 6. See People v. Hubbard (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 827, 833 [“[T]he violator is, during the period immediately preceding his execution of the promise to appear, under arrest.”]; People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 [traffic stops “are treated as detentions”].
"Investigative Detentions", Spring 2010 POINT OF VIEW, ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE. P. 1
13951(b)(1) Crime means a crime or public offense,...
Penal Code
A person charged with an infraction shall not be entitled to have the public defender or other counsel appointed at public expense
to represent him or her unless he or she is arrested and not released on his or her written promise to appear, his or her own
recognizance, or a deposit of bail.
689. No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, by a finding
of the court in a case where a jury has been waived, or by a plea of guilty.
In View of Code Civ. Proc. §24, declaring actions to be two kinds, civil and criminal, and §22, defining actions, there is no such thing as a “quasi-criminal act.”
Ex Parte Clark, 141 P. 831, 24 C.A. 389
Traffic experts and the public agree that traffic law enforcement is "criminal" only in a limited procedural sense.
People v. Lucas (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 47 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 235
[Crim. No. 31889. Second Dist., Div. Four. June 22, 1978.]
The classification of minor traffic violations as noncriminal infractions is receiving increasing attention in recent years, not only in California but in other jurisdictions, as a basis for more realistic treatment of the problem in the courts. Leading authorities in the field of criminal law are proposing that the historic distinction between petty and serious offenses be defined more systematically to facilitate enforcement of lesser violations of police regulations.1 The system under study involves the creation of a category of non-criminal offenses for which the sentence authorized upon conviction would be a fine or other civil penalty, such as the suspension of a license or attendance at a school for traffic violators.2 Jail would not be authorized as a sanction. Existing provisions of law on arrest, evidence, presumptions and defenses in misdemeanor cases would apply to traffic infractions and judges would conduct trials within the present framework or criminal procedure but without all the paraphernalia of jury trial. Other modifications to eliminate inappropriate criminal procedures on arraignment, bail and plea might be considered in order to reduce the number of appearances required of defendants who wish to appear on their traffic citations. No constitutional amendment would be required and the proposal could be adopted in California by appropriate amendments to the codes.
1967 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, CHAPTER 1 - A SYSTEM FOR CLASSIFYING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS AS NONCRIMINAL TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS, p. 31
...infractions are not crimes...
...upon the rationale the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes. (See People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795] and People v. Battle, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1.)
People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935
Courts's duty when interpreting statute is to discern intent of legislature.
State v. Arnold, 879 P.2d. 1272 (Or. 1994)
Judge's first duty in construing statute is to determine meaning of the language used by the legislature.
Coslett v. Third Street Grocery, 876 P.2d. 656 ( N.M. App. 1994)
- CONCLUSION -
INFRACTION "TRAFFIC STOP" = YOU'RE UNDER ARREST* AND IN CUSTODY* FOR NON-CRIMINAL* BEHAVIOR
* California Vehicle Code §§40300, 40500
* California Vehicle Code §40504
* People v. Sava, (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935
The so-called "Traffic Stop" is an arrest. When done without a warrant it's PRESUMED ILLEGAL. The PEACE OFFICER is REQUIRED to know the law and what IS and ISN'T a crime. An UNAUTHORIZED warranltess arrest is ILLEGAL. The application of the State's POLICE POWER to NONcriminal behavior is illegal. There is NO PROBABLE CAUSE or REASONABLE SUSPICION of any CRIME in regards to INFRACTIONS of the Vehicle Code. It is PRESUMED the officer is PROHIBITED from DISPARAGING and DENYING fundamental rights, after all, he/she swore an oath not to. Police officers are REQUIRED TO KNOW THE LAW!
THE PEOPLE v. JESUS SANTOS SANCHEZ REYES, (6/17/11) Case No. H035872, COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]). (See generally Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960) 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. 67.)
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112
"...an officer may be held liable in
damages to any person injured in
consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his
office... The
liability for nonfeasance, misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office
is
in his 'individual', not his official capacity..."
70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil
Liability
Personal
liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution
and laws, consists of the right to locomotion,- to go where one
pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or
pleasure, only restrained as the rights to others may make it necessary
for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along
the public highways or in public places; and while conducting
themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and
interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there, they will be
protected under law, not onlytheir persons, but in their safe
conduct.The constitution and the laws are framed for
the
public good, and the protection of all citizens from the highest to the
lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty, unless he
transgressed
some law. Any law which would place the keeping and
safe conduct
of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for
some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon
suspicion
of
felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all rights
which
our constitution guarantees.
Pinkerton v. Verberg 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979)
"The
privilege against self-incrimination
is neither accorded to the
passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to
one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be
retained
only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by an attorney or
solicitor.
It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in
person."
U.S. v Johnson, 76 F. Supp 538
Our
holding today is based exclusively on article I, section 13, of the
California Constitution, which requires a more exacting standard for
cases arising within this state.
In Cooper v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 58, 62 [17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734, 87 S.Ct. 788], the Supreme Court
recognized this well-known principle: "Our holding,
of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if
it chooses to do so."
In short, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law,...
This court has always assumed the independent vitality of our state Constitution.
Thus
in [13 Cal.3d 551] determining that California citizens are entitled to
greater protection under the California Constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizures than that required by the United
States Constitution, we are embarking on no revolutionary course.
Rather we are simply reaffirming a basic principle of federalism --
that the nation as a whole is composed of distinct geographical and
political entities bound together by a fundamental federal law but
nonetheless independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of
their citizens.
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528
[Crim. No. 16520. Supreme Court of California. February 20, 1975.]
...under the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) the evidence seized was the product of an unlawful search. We agree, and conclude the judgment must be reversed.
...the established rule that it is the People, rather than the defendant, who bear the burden of justifying a warrantless seizure. (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 [294 P.2d 23].)
Of
course, our past decisions do clearly affirm that, while not
controlling, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
similar provisions of the federal Constitution, like our sister state
courts' interpretations of similar state constitutional provisions,
will provide valuable guidance in the interpretation of our state
constitutional guarantees. (See, e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [156 Cal.Rptr.
14, 595 P.2d 592]; Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, supra, 12 Cal.2d 85, 89.)
People v. Longwill, 14 Cal.3d 943
[Crim. No. 17773. Supreme Court of California. August 7, 1975.]
Article
I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for the
defendant's defense." (See also U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)
This
conclusion, of course, simply reflects one of the principal tenets of
our federal system of government: just as the United States Supreme
Court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for determining
matters of federal law, this court bears the ultimate judicial
responsibility for resolving questions of state law, including the
proper interpretation of provisions of the state Constitution. (See
generally Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground (1973) 61 Cal.L.Rev. 273; Note, State Bills of
Rights (1973) 8 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 271, 285-286.)
In fulfilling this difficult and grave responsibility, we cannot
properly relegate our task to the judicial guardians of the federal
Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal obligation to
exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning and
application of state constitutional provisions.
People v. Chavez, 26 Cal.3d 334
[Crim. No. 20673. Supreme Court of California. January 29, 1980.]
It is settled that the streets of
a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable
right of every citizen
of the state.
Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, (1924)
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950)
THIS BUILDING IS WHERE A CORPORATION CONDUCTS IT'S BUSINESS
THIS IS WHERE SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE CORPORATION WORK
THE CORPORATE CHARTER FOR THIS CORPORATION IS
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
WHICH IN TURN APPLIES TO THE EMPLOYEES AND RESTRICTS THEIR CONDUCT
"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, ..."
Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.App.2d 25
[Civ. No. 13391. Second Dist., Div. One. Feb. 17, 1942.]
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE
that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the
conduct of the people’s business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their
deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating
authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not
good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments
they have created”.
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 3527
