Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos
(Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants)

Various California Code Sections
(active link)
Court Citations on Sovereignty
Your Right of Self-Defense
4th & 5th Amendment
Jurisdiction, etc.
Penal Code Sections


The organic law is the constitution of government, and is altogether written.  Other written laws are denominated statutes.The written law of this State is therefore contained in its Constitution and statutes, and in the Constitution and statutes of the United States.


Statutes are public or private.  A private statute is one which concerns only certain designated individuals, and effects only their private rights.  All other statutes are public, in which are included statutes creating or affecting corporations.

Excerpts from the:

Constitution for the State of California, 1849

Article I:  Declaration of Rights

Sec. 1.

All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty: acquiring, possessing and protecting property: and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Sec. 2.

All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people;...

Sec. 6.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.

Sec. 8.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in actual service, and the land and naval forces in time of war, or which this state may keep with the consent of Congress in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny under the regulation of the legislature) unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and in any trial in any court whatever, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel, as in civil actions.  No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence; nor shall he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Sec. 19.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.

Sec. 21.

This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.

Article III:  Distribution of Powers.

The powers of Government of the state of California shall be divided into three separate departments: the Legislative, the Executive, and Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.

To the People of California

The undersigned, Delegates to a Convention authorized to form a Constitution for the State of California, having to the best of their ability, discharged the high trust committed to them, respectfully submit the accompanying plan of Government for your approval.  Acknowledgingthe great fundamental principles, that all political power is inherent in the people, and that Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people, the Constitution presented for your consideration, is intended only to give such organic powers to the several departments of the proposed government as shall be necessary for its efficient administration: and while it is believed no power has been given, which is not thus essentially necessary, the Convention deem individual rights as well as public liberties are amply secured, by the People still retaining not only the great conservative power of free choice and election of all officers, agents and representatives, but the unalienable right to alter or reform their governments whenever the public good may require.

A free people, in the enjoyment of an elective government, capable of securing their civil, religious and political rights, may rest assured these inestimable privileges can never be wrested from them, so long as they keep a watchful eye on the operations of their government, and hold to strict accountability, those to whom power is delegated.

But it is confidently believed, when the government as now proposed, shall have gone into successful operation, when each department thereof shall move on harmoniously, in its appropriate and respective sphere; when laws based on the [35] eternal principles of equity and justice, shall be established; when every citizen of California, shall find himself secure in life, liberty and property...

The putting into operation of a Government, which shall establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of civil, religious and political liberty, shall be an object of the deepest solitude to every true hearted citizen, and the consummation of his dearest wishes.  The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and thus it is not only the privilege but the duty of every voter, to vote his sentiments.  No freemanof this land who values his birth-right and would transmit unimpared to his children, an inheritance so rich in glory and in honor, will refuse to give one day to the service of his country.

...a constitution intended to secure the peace, happiness and  prosperity of the whole people, but that their numerical and  political strength may be made manifest, and the world see, by what majority of freemen, California the bright star of the west, claims a place in the diadem of that glorious Republic, formed by the union of thirty one sovereign states”.

Article XI:  Miscellaneous Provisions

Sec. 3.      Members of the legislature, and all officers, executive and judicial, except such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall before they enter on the duties of their  respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or  affirmation:

 "I do  solemnly swear  (or affirm,  as the case may be) that I  will support  the constitution  of  the  United States,  and   the  Constitution   of  the  State of California;   and that  I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of ------ according to the best of my ability."

Who is Sovereign


 100.   (a) The sovereignty of the state resides in the people thereof,...


In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business.  It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.

The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.

”It will be observed that the people, who are sovereign,…

Irrespective of the villainy of the accused or he heinousness of his offense,  without regard for public opinion, or for the personal views of an individual officer as to the wisdom of the constitutional provision such provision is binding without qualification upon the courts until the people have by inherited process legally erased the constitutional mandate.

Only by strict adherence to this principle are we assured of the perpetuity of the guaranties of the Constitution in the equal administration of the laws where there are many judges of differing degrees of education, age, experience and background.

To insure the permanence of our free institutions all judicial officers must conform with the criteria established by the organic law.

No individual or public official is above, beyond or exempt from the mandates of the Constitutions, state and federal.  If judicial officers do not abide by their solemn pledge to protect and defend the Constitution, as well as to observe the limitations prescribed thereby, we must expect from the average citizen only contempt for our most cherished institutions and legal concepts.

If the constitutional guaranties are wrong, let the people change them-not judges or legislators.  Two wrongs cannot make a right.

History has demonstrated beyond a doubt that such a guaranty as is set forth in Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution is necessary for the protection of the citizen, and that it should be preserved at all hazards.  Any judicial official who refuses to give his loyalty to this ideal because of his feelings of revulsion at the nature of the offense charged against the accused either does not conceive the doctrine in its full meaning or he profanes the hallowed words of the patriots who convened in Philadelphia in 1787.

…affording the petitioner the rights guaranteed to him by the people of the State of California through their duly adopted Constitution…”.
Ex parte Keddy,   233 P.2d 159

"... No white person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction ... owes the status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution.  The history and aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is well known, and the purpose had in view in its adoption well understood.  That purpose was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous class of persons domiciled within the limits of the United States, who could not be brought within the operation of the naturalization laws because native born, and whose birth, though native, had at the same time left them without the status of citizenship.  These persons were not white persons, ... Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was settled that neither slaves, nor those who had been such, nor the descendants of these, though native and free born, were capable of becoming citizens of the United States.  (Dred Scott v.  Sanford, (sic)  19 How. 393.)  The Thirteenth Amendment, though conferring the boon of freedom upon native-born persons of African blood, had yet left them under an insuperable bar as to citizenship; and it was mainly to remedy this condition that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."
Van Valkenburg v. Brown (1872) 43 Cal. 43, 47.

"... And this brings us to inquire what is meant by the phrase 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' as used in this [so-called 14th] Amendment.

   "This phraseology was known in our history anterior to the formation of the present Federal Union.  In the articles of confederation between the American States it was provided 'that the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted,) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several States, and the people of each State shall, in  every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof, respectively,' etc.  (Art. IV.) The term 'privileges and immunities' was therefore not a new one when, in the second section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution, as originally ratified, it was declared that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'  The words 'privileges and immunities' had at that time acquired a distinctive meaning and a well-known signification.  They comprehended the enjoyment of life and liberty, and the right to acquire and possess property, and to demand and receive the protection of the Government in aid of these. ..." 
Van Valkenburg v. Brown
(1872) 43 Cal. 43, 48.

Your Right of Self-Defense

With regard to police training, police department failure to adequately train its officers may constitute a "policy" giving rise to governmental liability.
Ellis v. City of Fairburn, 852 F.Supp. 1568

"Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law."
In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.


§ 50. Right to use force

Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest.
Enacted 1872. Amended Code Amdts 1873-74 ch 612 §12.

SECTION 692-694

692.  Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be
   1. By the party about to be injured;
   2. By other parties.

693.  Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured:
   1. To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof.
   2. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession.

694.  Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense.

A private person may use such force as is necessary to prevent an assault upon his person or an injury to his property.
Frickstad v Medcraft (1929) 100 CA 188, 279 P  840; Nakashima v Takase (1935) 8 CA2d 35, 46 P2d 1020; Haeussler v De Loretto (1952) 109 CA2d 363, 240 P2d 654.

One may protect his property with all force reasonably necessary for that purpose.
Fawkes v Reynolds (1922) 190 C 204, 211 P 449.

The owner of property is justified in using force to eject a trespasser only when it is manifest that injury to the property is contemplated, and the owner is then entitled to use only such force as is reasonably necessary to justify the attack or to protect the property.
People v Corlett  (1944) 67 CA2d 33, 153 P2d 595, 964.

Force that one may use in self-defense is that which reasonably appears necessary in view of all circumstances to prevent impending injury.
McAfee v Ricker (1961) 195 CA2d 630, 15 Cal Rptr 920.

Property Rights - Ownership

SECTION 654-663

654.  The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others.  In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.

657.  Property is either:
   l. Real or immovable; or,
   2. Personal or movable.

663.  Every kind of property that is not real is personal.

SECTION  678-703

678.  The ownership of property is either:
   1. Absolute; or,
   2. Qualified.

679.  The ownership of property is absolute when a single person has the absolute dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it according to his pleasure, subject only to general laws.

Evidence Code

637. Ownership of things possessed
The things which a person possesses are presumed to be owned by him.
(Stats. 1965, c. 299,  § 2)

638.  Ownership of property by person who exercises acts of ownership
A person who exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it.
(Stats. 1965, c. 299,  § 2)

Personal and private information is PRIVATE PROPERTY.  Labor is private property.  Your car, truck, van, motor cycle is private property unless there is shared interest.  Your Power of Attorney is private property.

4th & 5th Amendment Issues

"It has come to be well recognized that the liberty  and the pursuit of happiness in which the individual is protected by the constitution of the United States and of the state applies as fully to his right to contract, his right to follow a legitimate vocation, untrammeled by unnecessary regulations, as it does to the freedom from arrest or restraint of his person.  This subject has received recent consideration by this court, and it is unnecessary to do more than refer to Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, [103 Am. St Rep. 82, 77 Pac. 924.]"
Ex parte Hayden (1905) 147 Cal. 649, 650.

An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government”.
Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94.

" officer may be held liable in damages to any person injured in consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his office...The liability for nonfeasance, misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office is in his 'individual', not his official capacity..."
70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability.

"...whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); also recognized in Brown v Texas, 443 US

 "Two  police  officers, while cruising  near noon in a patrol  car, observed appellant and another man walking  away from one  another in an alley  in an area  that had a high incidence of drug traffic.  They stopped and asked appellant to identify himself  and explain what he  was doing.  One  officer testified that he stopped  appellant because the  situation 'looked suspicious  and we had never  seen that  subject in  that area before.'   The officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any specific misconduct, nor did they have any  reason to  believe that  he was armed.   When  appellant refused to identify himself, he was arrested for violation of a Texas statute which makes  it a  criminal act for  a person to  refuse to give  his name and address  to an officer  'who has lawfully stopped  him and requested the
information.'  Appeallant's motion to set aside information charging him with  violation of the  statute on the ground  that the statute violated the  First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth  Amendments was denied, and he was convicted and fined."
Brown  v  Texas, 443 U.S.  47  (1979)

     HELD:  The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require  him to identify  himself violated the  Fourth Amendment because the  officers lacked any reasonable  suspicion to believe that appellant was  engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct.  Detaining appellant to require  him to  identify himself  constituted a  seizure of  his person subject  to the requirement of the  Fourth Amendment that the seizure be 'reasonable.'  Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1;... Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648.  Here,  the state does not  contend that appellant was  stopped pursuant to a practice  embodying neutral criteria, and the officer's actions were not justified  on the ground that they  had a reasonable suspicion, based on objective  facts, that he was involved in criminal activity.  Absent any basis  for suspecting appellant  of misconduct, the balance between the public  interest in crime  prevention and appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. Pp. 50-53.

     Mr.  Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the court; "This appeal presents the question whether appellant was validly convicted for refusing  to comply with  a policeman's demand  that he identify himself pursuant  to a provision of the Texas  Penal Code which makes it a crime to refuse such identification on request."

"Appellant  refused to  identify himself and  angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop him."

"The  Fourth Amendment, of course, `applies  to all seizures of the person,  including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional  arrest.'  Davis v. Mississippi,  394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).  '[W]henever a police officer accosts an  individual and restrains  his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that  person... and  the fourth Amendment  requires that  the seizure be reasonable'.' U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)"

"But even assuming that purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it..."

"We  need  not decide  whether an  individual  may be  punished for refusing  to identify himself  in the context  of a lawful investigatory stop  which satisfies Fourth Amendment  requirements. See Dunaway v. New York,  442 U.S. 200,210  n.12 (1979); Terry v.  Ohio... the county judge  who  convicted appellant was troubled by  this question, as shown by the colloquy set out in the appendix to this opinion."

"Accordingly,  appellant  may  not  be  punished  for  refusing  to identify himself, and the conviction is Reversed."


"THE COURT:...What do you think about if you stop a person lawfully,  and then if he doesn't want to talk to you, you put him in jail for committing a crime?"

"MR. PATTON [prosecutor]: Well first of all, I would question the  defendant's statement in his motion that the first amendment gives an individual the right to silence."

"THE COURT:...I'm asking you why should the State put you in jail because you don't want to say anything?"

"MR. PATTON: Well, I think there's certain interests that have to be  viewed."

"THE COURT: Okay, I'd like you to tell me what those are."

"MR. PATTON: Well, the Governmental interest to maintain the safety and security of the society and the citizens to live in the society,  and there are certainly strong Governmental interests in that
 direction and because of that, these interests outweigh the interests of an individual for a certain amount of intrusion upon his personal liberty.  I think these Governmental interests outweigh the
individual's interests in this respect, as far as simply asking an individual for his name and address under the proper circumstances."

THE COURT: But why should it be a crime to not answer?"

"MR. PATTON: Again, I can only contend that if an answer is not given, it tends to disrupt."

"THE COURT: What does it disrupt?"

"MR. PATTON: I think it tends to disrupt the goal of this society to maintain security over its citizens to make sure they are secure in  their gains and their homes."

"THE COURT: How does that secure anybody by forcing them, under penalty of being prosecuted, to giving their name and address, even though they are lawfully stopped?"

"MR. PATTON: Well I, you know, under the circumstances in which some  individuals would be lawfully stopped, it's presumed that perhaps this individual is up to something, and the officer is doing his duty simply to find out the individual's name and address, and to determine exactly what is going on."

"THE COURT: I'm not questioning, I'm not asking whether the officer shouldn't ask questions. I'm sure they should ask everything they possibly could find out.  What I'm asking is what's the State's interest in putting a man in jail because he doesn't want to answer something.  I realize lots of times an officer will give a defendant a Miranda warning which means a defendant doesn't have to make a statement.  Lots of defendants go ahead and confess, which is fine if  they want to do that.  But if they don't confess, you can't put them  in jail, can you, for refusing to confess to a crime?"

 "Our decisions recognize no exception to the rule that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible at trial, however relevant and trustworthy the seized evidence may be as an item of proof." "Fingerprint evidence is no exception to the rule that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the constitution is inadmissible in a state court. Pp.723-724. The Fourth Amendment applies to involuntary detention occurring at the investigatory stage as well as at the accusatory  stage.  Pp. 726-727. Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are subject to the constraints of the Fourth amendment.. P.727. "Nor  can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person's prints...the general  requirement that the authorization  of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context."
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)

While Fourth Amendment grants perhaps highest level of protection to dwellings, it applies to people's effects as well [including personal and private information that may be used against one] and, thus, applies even to vehicles and fixed structures; realistic and proper expectation of privacy created by circumstances is crucial to determining whether warrant is required under Fourth Amendment.
Suss  v.  American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F. Supp. 181.  (S.D.N.Y. 1993)

Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right to locomotion,- to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only restrained as the rights to others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there, they will be protected under law, not only their persons, but in their safe conduct. The constitution and the laws are framed for the public good, and the protection of all citizens from the highest to the lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty, unless he transgressed some law.  Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all rights which our constitution guarantees.
Pinkerton v. Verberg 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979)

Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal3d 777, 789, quoting Florida v. Royer (1983):  Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he was willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecutions his voluntary answers to such questions.  The person approached, however, need not answer any questions put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his own way.

The Supreme Court has recognized the significant intrusion occasioned by an identification requirement in a statute. See Brown v. Texas 443 U.S.47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). "We believe that the serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere possibility that identification may provide a link leading to arrest."

"...any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government.  It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American.  It may suit the purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom,...

And we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure -- and an unreasonable search and seizure -- within the meaning of the fourth amendment,"
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)


"The constitutional privilege [of the Fifth Amendment] was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent, as well as the innocent and foresighted."
Marchetti v U.S., 390 U.S. 39, 51.

"Government seeking to punish individual must produce evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his mouth...Privilege against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when person is guaranteed right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in unfettered exercise of his own will...Defendant's constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, on involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity, even if there is ample evidence aside from confession to support conviction... Fifth amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed, from being compelled to incriminate themselves...Prosecution may not use at trial fact that defendant stood mute or claimed his privilege in face of accusations...Any statement taken after person invokes fifth amendment privilege cannot be other than product of compulsion...Any evidence that accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into waiver will show that he did not voluntarily waive privilege to remain silent."
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 468.[BOLD supplied]

"The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by an attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person."
U.S. v Johnson, 76 F. Supp 538.

Title 42 USC 1983:

     "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or territory, or the District of  Columbia, subjects, or causes to  be subjected, any  citizen of the United  States, or other person within  the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution  and laws, shall  be liable  to the  party injured  in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress."

     "To  maintain an action under  42 USC 1983, it is not necessary to allege or prove that the defendants intended to deprive plaintiff of his Constitutional rights or that they acted willfully, purposefully, or in a  furtherance of a conspiracy.  . . it is sufficient to establish that the deprivation. . . was the  natural consequences of defendants acting under  color of law. . .  ."
Ethridge v. Rhodos,  DC Ohio 268 F Supp 83(1967), Whirl v. Kern CA 5 Texas 407 F 2d 781 (1968)

Title  18 USC Section 241,  provides that... "any person who goes on the highway in disguise to prevent or hinder the free exercise  and enjoyment of any right  so secured by law...shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.

     Further,  Title 18, United States Code,  Section 242, provides  for one  or  more  persons  who, under  color  of  law,  statute, ordinance, regulation,  or custom, willfully subjects  any inhabitant of any state, territory,  or  district to  the deprivation  of rights,  privileges, or immunities  secured by the Constitution, or laws of the United States. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

     Title  18, United States  Code, Section 242, with  its color of law provision,  gives a  cause of  action to  apply Title  18, United States Code, Section 241, because Section 241 needs two persons in disguise and Section  242 provides the second person under color of law as the "QUASI SUMMONS" mentioned herein implies that a judge in the Municipal Court is acting  in concert  to commit  an overt act  of fraud  and extortion for conversion.

     Further, United States Code, Title 18, section 242 provides for one or more persons who, under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . shall be  fined not more than  $1,000 or imprisoned not  more than one year or both.

This includes police officers (officers of the Executive branch of governement).

"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.  In a Government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Crime is contagious. If government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the invites every man to become a law unto himself...and against that pernicious doctrine, this court should resolutely set its face."
Olmstead v U.S., 277 US 348, 485; 48 S. Ct. 564, 575; 72 LEd 944.

Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop.
U.S. v. Thomas, 863 F2d. 622, 625

In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of circumstances should be considered.
U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8; U.S. v. Hernandez-Alvarado , 891 F2d. 1414.

Founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articulable facts that, together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonable warrant a suspicion that the person to be detain has committed or is about to commit a crime.
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 416, U.S. v. Robert L., 874 F2d. 701, 703

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detention.  Any restraint of a person for the purpose of checking identification and asking questions or detaining him or her briefly while obtaining is such a detention; it comported with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offense.  The mere presence with someone who has a outstanding arrest warrant is not sufficient.
U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 [83 L.Ed.2d. 604].

In a unanimous decision the U.S. Supreme Court held: 'demand for identification is an intrusion on the interests prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts relating to the person or his or her conduct, in order to be lawful.

When police officers, with or without arresting an individual, detain the individual for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they perform a seizure of person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ...that the defendant's conviction requiring identification upon a lawful stop was improper, the police officer's stopping the defendant and requiring him to identify himself violated defendant's Fist, Fourth and Fifth Amendments was in violation of...United States Constitution when the police officer has no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged or been engaged in criminal conduct.
Brown v. Texas, (1979) 443 U.S. 46 [61 L.Ed.2d. 357].

"Personal liberty is a fundamental interest second only to life itself, protected by both the California and United States Constitutions.
(People v. Olivas, (1976) 17 Cal.3d. 236, 251, [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 64, 551 P.2d. 375, 384]) It is beyond dispute that a principal ingredient of personal liberty is 'freedom from bodily restraint' (Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399, [43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042] In re Roger S. 19 Cal.3d. 921, [141 Cal.Rptr 298, 301, 569 P.2d. 1268.

The term "liberty " as used in state and federal constitutions consists partially of the right to be free from arbitrary restraint; for example, the right of a citizen to drive on public street [or walk on the sidewalk] with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right.
People v. Horton, (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d. 930, [92 Ca.Rptr. 666]


"the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil
in Alabama or any of the new states which were formed ... The United States has no
Constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent
domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is
expressly granted ..."
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.C. 212, 221, 223

"... the states are separate sovereigns with respect to the federal government"
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82

"A universal principle as old as the law, is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property."
Norwood v. Kenfield, 34 C. 329; Ex parte Giabonini, 117 C. 573, [49 P. 732]

Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio.
Re Application of Wyatt, 114 Ca.App. 557, [300 P. 132]; Re Cavitt, 47 Cal.App.2d. 698, [118 P.2d. 846].

(As would be any action of any officer acting under color of authority.)



Police officer may not rely on good faith, inarticulable hunches, or generalized suspicions to meet standard of reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory stop.
U.S.  v.  Velarde, 823 F. Supp. 792.  (D. Hawaii 1993)

A constitutional amendment adopted in 1974 elevated the right of privacy to an "inalienable right" expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate (Cal. Const. art. I, 1). It may be safely assumed that the right of privacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the details on one's personal life.
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 652, [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d. 977]

Party possesses standing to sue if he or she has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury that is fairly traceable to challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by favorable decision.
Concrete Workers of Colorado, Inc.  v.  City and County of Denver, Colo., 823 F.Supp. 821.
(D. Colo. 1993)

"Seizure" takes place when some meaningful interference with individual's possessory interest in property occurs.
Suss  v.  American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F. Supp. 181.  (S.D.N.Y. 1993)

SECTION 528-539

532.  (a) Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained.

SECTIONS 118-129

118.  (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.  This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.
   (b) No person shall be convicted of perjury where proof of falsity rests solely upon contradiction by testimony of a single person other than the defendant.  Proof of falsity may be established by direct or indirect evidence.

118.1.  Every peace officer who files any report with the agency which employs him or her regarding the commission of any crime or any investigation of any crime, if he or she knowingly and intentionally makes any statement regarding any material matter in the report which the officer knows to be false, whether or not the statement is certified or otherwise expressly reported as true, is guilty of filing a false report punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year, or in the state prison for one, two, or three years.  This section shall not apply to the contents of any statement which the peace officer attributes in the report to any other person.  

123.  It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it
was made.  It is sufficient that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding.

125.  An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which one knows to be false.

126.  Perjury is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four years.

129.  Every person who, being required by law to make any return, statement, or report, under oath, willfully makes and delivers any such return, statement, or report, purporting to be under oath, knowing the same to be false in any particular, is guilty of perjury, whether such oath was in fact taken or not.

SECTION 132-140

132.  Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or  other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

132.5.  (a) A person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is a crime or who has personal knowledge of facts that he or she knows, or reasonably should know, may require that person to be called as a witness in a criminal prosecution shall not accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any payment or benefit in consideration for providing information obtained as result of witnessing the event or occurrence
or having personal knowledge of the facts.
   (b) A violation of this section is a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not exceeding six months, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.

132.5.  (a) The Legislature supports and affirms the constitutional right of every person to communicate on any subject.  This section is intended to preserve the right of every accused person to a fair trial, the right of the people to due process of law, and the integrity of judicial proceedings.

133.  Every person who practices any fraud or deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits any false statement, representation, token, or writing, to any witness or person about to be called as a witness upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, with intent to affect the testimony of such witness, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

136.  As used in this chapter:
   (1) "Malice" means an intent to vex, annoy, harm, or injure in any way another person, or to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice.

136.1.  (a) Except as provided in subdivision (c), any person who does any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison:
(c) Every person doing any of the acts described in subdivision
(a) or (b) knowingly and maliciously under any one or more of the
following circumstances, is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years under
any of the following circumstances:
   (1) Where the act is accompanied by force or by an express or
implied threat of force or violence, upon a witness or victim or any
third person or the property of any victim, witness, or any third


51.  This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
   All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,...

51.7.  (a) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation

52.1.  (a) Whenever a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights
   (b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.

A constitutional amendment adopted in 1974 elevated the right of privacy to an "inalienable right" expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate (Cal. Const. art. I, 1). It may be safely assumed that the right of privacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the details on one's personal life.
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 652, [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d. 977]

A statutory privilege cannot override a defendant's constitutional right. People v. Reber, (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d. 523 [223 Cal.Rptr. 139}; Vela v. Superior Ct, 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255 Cal.Rptr. 921], however, "the judiciary has a solemn obligation to insure that the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial is realized.  If that right would be thwarted by enforcement of a statute, the state...must yield."
Vela v. Superior Ct, 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255 Cal.Rptr. 921].

Of course, opposing counsel has the right to learn the operative facts as it relates to the issues.
Mack v. Superior Ct., (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d. 7; Kenny v. Superior Ct., (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d. 106.

As my own "attorney in fact" I am well within my rights to ascertain the nature of ANY officers investigation.

Intentional suppression of any material evidence constitutes a violation of due process, regardless of the good or bad faith of the part of the State.
Arizona v. Youngblood, (1988) 488 U.S. 51[102 L.ed.2d. 281, 109 S.Ct. 333].

Evidence Code

§623.  Estoppel by own statement or conduct.

Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.
(Stats. 1965, c. 299, § 2)